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Footnotes
1. 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
2. The Court also held that the ALJ who presides over Lucia’s case on
remand cannot be Judge Elliot, even if he has now been properly
appointed.  Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor disagreed.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. Justice Breyer would have held that allowing the SEC’s staff to
appoint the agency’s ALJs violated the Administrative Procedure
Act.
5. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
6. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051 (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508, 511-12 (1879)).
7. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per
curiam)).
8. Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas would have vastly
broadened the group of federal workers who are officers and thus
must be appointed by one of the means specified in the Appoint-
ments Clause.  Drawing from his perception of the Founders’
likely understanding of the term “Officers,” he argued that the
term includes “all federal civil officials who perform an ongoing,
statutory duty—no matter how important or significant the duty,”
including the likes of “recordkeepers, clerks, and tidewaiters
(individuals who watched goods land at a customhouse).”  Id. at
2057 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
On the final day of the Supreme Court’s October 2017Term, Justice Anthony Kennedy announced his retire-ment, capping what already had been a historic year at
1 First Street Northeast. Justice Kennedy’s final year on the
Court yielded a large number of broadly significant rulings in
civil cases on matters concerning administrative agencies, exec-
utive power, religious freedom, voter-registration lists,
employer-employee arbitration, public-sector unions, and
states’ power to require out-of-state sellers to collect sales taxes,
to name only a few. There is much to discuss, so off we go.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In a case that had been closely followed in administrative-
law circles, the Court held in Lucia v. SEC1 that the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s administrative-law judges are
“Officers of the United States” who must be appointed through
one of the means authorized by the Constitution’s Appoint-
ments Clause. The SEC’s practice had been to allow its staff
members to select the agency’s ALJs. When one of those
ALJs—Judge Cameron Elliot—presided over the agency’s
administrative proceeding against Raymond Lucia and issued
stiff sanctions against him, Lucia objected that the proceeding
was invalid because Judge Elliot had been appointed in an
unconstitutional manner. The SEC and the D.C. Circuit
rejected that argument, but the Supreme Court reversed and
ordered that Lucia be given a new hearing before a properly
appointed ALJ.2
The Appointments Clause limits the means by which “Offi-
cers of the United States” may be appointed. As a general rule,
all officers must be nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, but Congress can elect to “vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”3
Are the SEC’s ALJs “Officers” within the meaning of that clause,
or are they mere employees about whose hiring the Appoint-
ments Clause says nothing? The weightiest factor favoring the
latter conclusion was the fact that all of the ALJs’ rulings may be
reviewed by the Commissioners—either at the request of a party
or upon the initiative of the Commissioners themselves—and
thus there is a significant degree to which the Commissioners
supervise the ALJs’ work. But only Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor were persuaded by that argument.4 Led by Justice
Kagan and relying heavily upon its 1991 ruling in Freytag v.
Commissioner5—a case concerning the status of the United
States Tax Court’s “special trial judges”—the Court concluded
that the SEC’s ALJs are officers. Their positions are “‘continu-
ing’” rather than “‘temporary’” in nature,6 Justice Kagan
explained, and they wield “‘significant authority,’”7 including
(among other things) the power to administer oaths, make evi-
dentiary rulings, manage the conduct of parties and their attor-
neys, and impose sanctions for disobeying discovery orders. Just
as importantly, they issue decisions that—unless the Commis-
sioners intervene—become the agency’s final word on the par-
ties’ claims and defenses. Because they are thus officers (of the
“inferior” variety), the Court concluded, they may be appointed
by the Commissioners themselves (as the collective head of the
department) but cannot be appointed by the SEC’s staff.8
The Court’s ruling raises an important question concerning
the reach of its 2010 holding in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board.9 In that case, the Court
held that—lest the President’s ability to faithfully execute fed-
eral law be thwarted—Congress cannot give officers job secu-
rity in the form of two or more layers of good-cause protection
from direct or indirect presidential removal. In Free Enterprise
Fund itself, the SEC’s Commissioners were (and today remain)
officers who statutorily are subject to removal by the President
only for cause, and so the members of the SEC’s Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board—officers who work under
the Commissioners’ supervision—could not also be given
good-cause protection from removal. So where does that leave
the SEC’s ALJs, who now enjoy “Officer” status? Current fed-
eral law says they can be removed by the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board but only for good cause, and the members of the
MSPB themselves may be removed (by the President) only for
good cause. Putting together Lucia and Free Enterprise Fund,
are the job-security protections currently enjoyed by the SEC’s
ALJs unconstitutional? Justice Breyer flagged that issue in a
separate opinion—just as he flagged it when dissenting in Free
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Enterprise Fund—but Justice Kagan’s majority declined the
Government’s invitation to address it.
In a pair of cases addressing the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office’s congressionally authorized “inter partes review” pro-
gram, the justices sparred over important issues of administra-
tive law. Implemented in 2012, the PTO’s program allows pri-
vate parties to file a petition asking the PTO to reexamine a
previously issued patent. If the PTO’s director concludes that a
patent challenger is likely to prevail on one or more of its
claims, the director is authorized to launch inter partes review.
Through that process, the patent challenger and patent holder
litigate the merits of the challenged patent, and the PTO’s
Patent Trial and Appeal Board issues a final decision, cancel-
ing, confirming, or amending the challenged patent as it sees
fit, subject to the Federal Circuit’s appellate review.
In Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group,10
the Court ruled 7-2 that the legislation authorizing the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board to revoke patents does not violate Arti-
cle III’s vesting of the judicial power in courts staffed by polit-
ically insulated judges. Particularly noteworthy is the conflict
between two of the Court’s most conservative members—Jus-
tice Thomas, who wrote for the majority, and Justice Gorsuch
(joined by Chief Justice Roberts), who dissented. Justice
Thomas emphasized that the Court’s “precedents have given
Congress significant latitude to assign adjudication of public
rights to entities other than Article III courts,”11 and “[i]nter
partes review falls squarely within the public-rights doc-
trine.”12 Justice Thomas reinforced the majority’s conclusion
with the claim that, at the time of the founding, the English
law of patents authorized the Executive—acting through the
Privy Council—to revoke patents. For Justice Gorsuch in dis-
sent, the details of the public-rights doctrine were irrelevant.
The Constitution authorizes only Article III courts to adjudi-
cate matters that England’s common-law courts would have
handled in 1789, he argued, and—on his view of the historical
record—“only courts could hear patent challenges in England
at the time of the founding.”13
Leading a 5-4 Court that divided along familiar lines, Justice
Gorsuch wrote for the majority in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu.14
The issue in that case was whether, when launching the inter
partes review process, the PTO’s director is statutorily autho-
rized to narrow the proceedings to focus on some (rather than
all) of the patent challengers’ claims. The PTO had concluded
that the director did possess this authority, but the Court held
that Congress had unambiguously directed to the contrary. For
Justice Breyer and the three other dissenters, the statutory lan-
guage was ambiguous and the PTO’s interpretation of the
statute was reasonable, so deference to the agency’s interpreta-
tion was appropriate under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.15
Justice Gorsuch’s reply on
behalf of the majority will give
little comfort to proponents of
Chevron deference and its role in
today’s administrative state:
“[W]hether Chevron should
remain is a question we may
leave for another day.”16 In fact,
skepticism about Chevron
emerged as a theme as the Term
proceeded. In his opinion for a 5-4 majority in Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis17 (discussed below under the “Arbitration” head-
ing), Justice Gorsuch similarly noted that “[n]o party to these
cases has asked us to reconsider Chevron deference.”18 In a
concurring opinion filed in a subsequent case concerning the
removal of nonpermanent residents, Justice Kennedy even
more explicitly urged litigants—and ultimately the Court—to
give Chevron a second look. He said that he was “troubl[ed]”
by lower courts’ frequent “reflexive deference” to agencies’
statutory interpretations, and that “more troubling still” is
courts’ deference to agencies on statutory questions concern-
ing the agencies’ own authority.19 Justice Kennedy wrote that
the Court should reexamine Chevron “in an appropriate case,”
to ensure that the prevailing rules of statutory interpretation
“accord with constitutional separation-of-powers principles
and the function and province of the Judiciary.”20
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Adopted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Alien Tort
Statute declares, in full: “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”21 In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,22 roughly 6,000
foreign nationals sought to rely upon the ATS when suing Arab
Bank in a federal district court. They alleged that, with the aid
of its New York branch, the bank had helped finance terrorist
attacks on the plaintiffs and their families in the Middle East.
In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that—until Congress says oth-
erwise—“foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits
brought under the ATS.”23 A ruling to the contrary, Justice
Kennedy wrote for the majority, would raise complex foreign-
policy issues and would not further the original purpose of the
ATS, which was to provide “foreign plaintiffs a remedy for
international-law violations in circumstances where the
absence of such a remedy might provoke foreign nations to
hold the United States accountable.”24 In a lengthy dissent
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, Justice
Sotomayor argued that “[n]othing about the corporate form in
“Justice Kennedy
wrote that the
Court should
reexamine
Chevron ‘in an
appropriate
case[.]’”
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32. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
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36. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . .
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
38. 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018).
itself raises foreign-policy con-
cerns that require the Court, as
a matter of common-law dis-
cretion, to immunize all for-
eign corporations from liabil-
ity under the ATS, regardless
of the specific law-of-nations
violations alleged.”25
ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE
In Murphy v. NCAA,26 the Court held 7-2 that Congress’s Pro-
fessional and Amateur Sports Protection Act ran afoul of the
anti-commandeering doctrine. In that legislation, Congress had
taken steps to curb gambling on amateur and professional
sports. Rather than make sports gambling a federal crime, how-
ever, Congress declared that states could not “authorize” gam-
bling on “competitive games in which amateur or professional
athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or
more performances of such athletes in such games.”27 The
financial and political burden of ensuring that sports gambling
did not occur, in other words, would rest primarily on state
governments.
Relying heavily upon its rulings in 1992’s New York v. United
States28 and 1997’s Printz v. United States,29 the Court held that
“[a] more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imag-
ine.”30 The statute, Justice Alito wrote for the majority,
“unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may
not do. . . . It is as if federal officers were installed in state leg-
islative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop
legislators from voting on any offending proposals.”31 If Con-
gress wishes to ban gambling on sports, the Court concluded,
it must do so directly. Finding the commandeering provision
not severable from the rest of the legislation, the Court struck
down the entire Act.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed qualms
about the Court’s severability precedents insofar as they
require judges to speculate about what legislators would have
preferred in counterfactual scenarios. By virtue of her having
filed a dissent, we know that Justice Ginsburg—joined by Jus-
tice Sotomayor—did not embrace the Court’s reasoning on the
anti-commandeering issue. Rather than say anything on that
subject, however, she focused all of her attention on attacking
the majority’s conclusion that the entire Act had to fall. On
this issue of severability, Justice Breyer aligned himself with
the dissent.
ARBITRATION
In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,32 the Court handed down a
major 5-4 ruling concerning arbitration and employer-
employee agreements. The case concerned contracts in which
employees had agreed to use individualized arbitration—
rather than class or collective actions—to resolve any dis-
agreements that arose between them and their employers.
When employees filed class and collective actions alleging they
were owed overtime pay, the employers sought to compel indi-
vidualized arbitration pursuant to the prior agreements. The
employees argued that those agreements were unenforceable.
Pointing out that the Federal Arbitration Act’s saving clause
allows courts to declare arbitration agreements void “upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract,”33 the employees insisted their contracts’ arbitra-
tion provisions violated their right under the National Labor
Relations Act “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the pur-
pose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”34
The Court rejected the employees’ argument. Writing for
the five-member majority, Justice Gorsuch first emphasized
that the FAA’s saving clause explicitly refers only to grounds
that can render “any” contract unenforceable. That is a refer-
ence, he explained, to such things as fraud and uncon-
scionability, rather than to legal grounds that apply only to par-
ticular kinds of agreements. Turning to the employees’ argu-
ment that the NLRA’s protection of “other concerted activities”
supersedes the FAA in any event, the Court disagreed. Group
litigation akin to today’s class and collective actions was rare
when Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, Justice Gorsuch
said, and the text of the statute provides no clear evidence that
Congress had such litigation devices in mind.
Justice Ginsburg emphatically dissented, arguing that the
majority had disregarded Congress’s effort to protect employ-
ees’ ability to find “strength in numbers.”35 “Congressional
correction of the Court’s elevation of the FAA over workers’
rights to act in concert,” she wrote, “is urgently in order.”36
CONTRACTS CLAUSE AND DIVORCE
Like twenty-five other states, Minnesota has enacted legis-
lation declaring that—unless a court says otherwise in a
divorce decree—a divorce automatically revokes a person’s
designation of his or her former spouse as the beneficiary of a
life insurance policy. The legislation permits the insured indi-
vidual to retain the former spouse as the beneficiary, however,
by sending the insurance company a notification to that effect.
Suppose the insured fails to send any such notice. Does the
state’s default rule violate the Contracts Clause37 if the
insured’s contract was formed prior to the legislation’s enact-
ment?
In Sveen v. Melin38—a case pitting a former wife against two
children who had been named as a policy’s contingent benefi-
ciaries—the Court held 8-1 that Minnesota’s law is constitu-
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43. I discuss Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876
(2018)—a case concerning political apparel at polling places—
under the “Speech” heading, below.
44. The Court also handed down a ruling in Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S.
Ct. 1942 (2018), a case concerning Maryland’s use of a districting
map that allegedly was drawn to retaliate against Republican vot-
ers in the state’s Sixth Congressional District.  In a per curiam rul-
ing, the justices unanimously concluded that the balance of equi-
ties and the public interest weighed in support of the district
court’s refusal to issue a preliminary injunction barring Maryland
from using that map in the 2018 congressional elections.
45. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
46. Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas refused to join this part
of the Court’s opinion.  In these two justices’ view, the Court
should have dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims altogether.
47. 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018).
48. The litigated program is not Ohio’s sole means of purporting to
keep its list of eligible voters up to date.  The state also relies upon
change-of-address data supplied by the U.S. Postal Service.
tionally permissible. Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan
found that “Minnesota’s revocation-on-divorce statute does not
substantially impair pre-existing contractual arrangements.”39
She explained:
First, the statute is designed to reflect a policyholder’s
intent—and so to support, rather than impair, the con-
tractual scheme. Second, the law is unlikely to disturb
any policyholder’s expectations because it does no more
than a divorce court could always have done. And third,
the statute supplies a mere default rule, which the poli-
cyholder can undo in a moment.40
Justice Gorsuch dissented, questioning whether the Court’s
analytic framework for Contracts Clause cases is consistent
“with the Constitution’s original public meaning,”41 and argu-
ing that changing a life insurance policy’s beneficiary designa-
tion amounts to a substantial and unreasonable impairment of
a contract. Minnesota’s law, he concluded, “cannot survive an
encounter with even the breeziest of Contracts Clause tests.”42
ELECTIONS43
Throughout much of the Term, there was widespread antic-
ipation that the justices would shed significant new light on
whether the Constitution gives the judiciary a prominent role
in policing partisan gerrymandering. It was not to be. Much
(though not all44) of the attention was focused on Gill v. Whit-
ford,45 a case concerning Wisconsin Republicans’ adoption of
district lines that, in 2012, enabled them to win 60 of the State
Assembly’s 99 seats with just 48.6 percent of the statewide vote
and that, in 2014, enabled them to win 63 of the State Assem-
bly’s 99 seats with 52 percent of the statewide vote. A dozen
Democratic voters in the state challenged the map, arguing
that, by making it harder for Democrats than Republicans to
convert votes into victories, the legislature had violated the
plaintiffs’ rights of association and equal protection. The three-
member district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and
enjoined the state from using the map in future elections, but
the verdict did not hold. The justices unanimously concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the individualized
harm necessary to establish standing under Article III.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts explained that,
although the plaintiffs had included a First Amendment associ-
ation claim in their complaint, they proceeded to litigate their
case almost entirely upon a theory of vote dilution. Specifically,
the plaintiffs focused on proving
that, on a statewide basis, Democ-
rats had suffered a loss in voting
power because they had been both
“packed” and “cracked” into leg-
islative districts. That is, the plain-
tiffs sought to prove that Wiscon-
sin Democrats had (in some
instances) been crammed into districts where their numbers
were far greater than necessary to elect a Democratic candidate
and had (in other instances) been scattered among districts in
which their low numbers would make it exceedingly difficult to
elect a candidate of their choosing. In advancing those claims at
trial, the plaintiffs emphasized what they believed Republican
legislators had done to Democratic voters on a statewide basis;
the plaintiffs never sought to prove that they themselves had been
packed or cracked in their own individual districts and that
redrawing the boundaries of all of the state’s legislative districts
was necessary to remedy those individual harms. Rather than
dismiss the case outright for lack of jurisdiction, however, the
Court remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to try to
produce the evidence necessary to establish standing.46
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, Justice
Kagan filed a concurring opinion aimed at training a flashlight
on the legal path that lies ahead. She suggested that it should
not be difficult on remand for the plaintiffs to produce suffi-
cient evidence of individualized harm, she appeared to encour-
age the plaintiffs to develop their First Amendment association
claim, and she argued that today’s technology-empowered par-
tisan gerrymandering produces democracy-degrading harms
that only courts can effectively remedy. In his opinion for the
Court, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly declined to take a posi-
tion on whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable.
The Court divided 5-4 along familiar lines in two of the
Term’s election-law cases. The first—Husted v. A. Philip Ran-
dolph Institute47—concerned one of the ways in which Ohio
(together with a handful of other states) purports to maintain
an accurate list of individuals who are eligible to vote because
they continue to reside in the voting districts for which they are
registered.48 Under the program in question, Ohio first identi-
fies registered voters who, over a two-year period, failed to vote
or engage in any other voter activity (such as signing a peti-
tion). The state then sends each of those individuals a notice
alerting them that their voter registration will be canceled
unless they either (1) return a preaddressed, postage-prepaid
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card confirming that they continue
to reside in the district where they
are registered or (2) vote in at least
one election during the following
four years. The battle in Husted was
about whether this program vio-
lates federal statutory law.
At the heart of the dispute were
two provisions of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.
The first—referred to by the Court as “subsection (d)”—says
that a state cannot remove a person from its voting rolls unless
one of two things has happened: (1) the person confirms in writ-
ing that he or she has moved out of the district where he or she
is registered to vote or (2) the person (a) fails to return a pread-
dressed, postage-prepaid card in response to a mailed notice that
the voter’s registration will be canceled if he or she does not vote
during the period covered by the following two federal general
elections and then (b) does indeed fail to cast a ballot during
that four-year period. As described thus far, Ohio’s program
appears unassailably compliant with the NVRA’s requirements.
But the NVRA contains a second provision—the “Failure-to-
Vote Clause”—that complicates matters. It declares that, while a
state may rely upon the list-pruning procedures specified in sub-
section (d), a state cannot remove a person from its voting rolls
“by reason of the person’s failure to vote.”49 Does Ohio violate
this provision when it uses a person’s failure to vote as the sole
basis for triggering the notification process and four-year clock
authorized by subsection (d)?
Led by Justice Alito, a majority of the Court concluded that
Ohio’s program is permissible. Justice Alito reasoned that the
Failure-to-Vote Clause prohibits a state from relying solely
upon a person’s nonvoting as a basis for removing him or her
from the state’s list of authorized voters. For that interpreta-
tion, Justice Alito relied heavily upon the Help America Vote
Act of 2002, in which Congress clarified that “registrants who
have not responded to a notice and who have not voted in 2
consecutive general elections for Federal office shall be
removed from the official list of eligible voters, except that no
registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to
vote.”50 Ohio had not relied “solely” upon individuals’ failure
to vote, the Court found—it had also relied upon individuals’
failure to respond to mailings alerting them that their voter
registrations were in peril. The majority concluded that Ohio
had thus met Congress’s standards.
Joined in dissent by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor,51 and
Kagan, Justice Breyer argued that Congress had barred states
from using a person’s failure to vote as the sole basis for
launching a process that may culminate in his or her removal
from the voting rolls. He further contended that Ohio’s pro-
gram was unreasonable—and thus violated another provision
of the NVRA52—because the number of registered voters who
fail to respond to their written notifications vastly exceeds the
number of voters whom statistics indicate likely did, in fact,
move to a different state or voting district.
Justice Alito wrote for an identically composed five-member
majority in Abbott v. Perez,53 a case concerning congressional
and state districting maps that Texas’s Republican-led legisla-
ture adopted in 2013. The next few sentences will give readers
a taste of the complexity that awaits them in the full opinion.
The Texas legislature adopted the contested maps in 2013,
amidst litigation concerning maps that it had previously
adopted in 2011. With only a few modifications, the 2013
maps—which the state deployed for the 2014 and 2016 elec-
tions—were the same maps that a three-member federal dis-
trict court produced on an interim basis for the 2012 elections
during the litigation over the 2011 maps. In the 2017 ruling
that precipitated the Supreme Court’s decision in Abbott, the
district court held that the reason the legislature in 2013
adopted the district court’s 2012 maps was because it believed
those maps would discriminate against racial-minority voters
in some of the same ways that, in the court’s judgment, the leg-
islature had illegally intended back when it drew the 2011
maps. Wholly apart from that finding of unlawful discrimina-
tory intent, the district court further held that three districts
diluted the strength of Latino voters in violation of Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act and that a fourth district—House Dis-
trict 90—was an impermissible racial gerrymander. 
The Supreme Court agreed that House District 90 had been
illegally drawn along racial lines, but reversed the district court
in all other respects. A preliminary issue on which the nine jus-
tices narrowly divided was whether the Court had jurisdiction
in the first place. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, the Court has
mandatory appellate jurisdiction to review any issuance or
denial of an injunction by a three-member federal district
court. The complicating factor here arose from the fact that the
district court never explicitly granted injunctive relief. What
did happen is that the court announced that the state’s 2013
maps were illegal and needed to be fixed; it gave the state three
days to tell the court whether the Texas legislature would take
steps to remedy the problems; Texas’s governor declared that
the state would not be taking any action; and the district court
scheduled hearings to discuss what should happen next.
Rather than participate in the remedy-focused hearings that
the district court had scheduled, Texas appealed to the
Supreme Court. Did Section 1253 give the Court jurisdiction
to hear the case?
A majority of the Court concluded that it did. The district
court’s orders had the “‘practical effect’” of an injunction,54 Jus-
49. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2).
50. 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)(A).
51. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor accused the
majority of “ignor[ing] the history of voter suppression against
which the NVRA was enacted and uphold[ing] a program that
appears to further the very disenfranchisement of minority and
low-income voters that Congress set out to eradicate.”  Husted,
138 S. Ct. at 1865 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
52. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4) (directing each state to “conduct a
general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the
names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters”)
(emphasis added).
53. 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).
54. Id. at 2319 (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79,
83 (1981)).
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tice Alito wrote, and this is all that Section 1253 requires. For
Justice Sotomayor and her colleagues in dissent, the majority’s
handling of the jurisdictional question was far too permissive
and signaled the majority’s willingness to “go[] out of its way”
to uphold racially discriminatory maps.55
On the merits, the majority held that the district court
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the state, requir-
ing it to demonstrate that, when it adopted the state’s current
maps in 2013, it had abandoned the racially discriminatory
objectives that, in the district court’s judgment, animated the
legislature’s prior adoption of the 2011 maps. The dissent
insisted that the district court had kept the burden of proof on
the maps’ challengers, and argued that the majority had failed
to give proper deference to the district court’s factual findings
concerning the 2013 legislature’s motivations. The justices dis-
agreed just as sharply on whether the district court had prop-
erly found that three of the districts violated Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act by diluting Latino voters’ strength. The jus-
tices found agreement only with respect to House District 90,
one of the rare districts that the legislature in 2013 had not
simply copied from the district court’s own 2012 work. Texas
conceded that race was the predominant factor for drawing
House District 90’s boundaries, but argued that Section 2
necessitated the state’s race-conscious actions. None of the jus-
tices was persuaded by that argument.56
EXECUTIVE POWER
After promising on the campaign trail to curb the influx of
Muslims into the United States, and after litigating an initial
executive order that some concluded was aimed at fulfilling
that promise, President Trump issued the presidential procla-
mation at issue in Trump v. Hawaii.57 The president issued that
proclamation after several federal agencies worked together at
his request to identify countries that—by virtue of their docu-
mentation systems, links to terrorist groups, and other fac-
tors—fail to provide adequate assurance that their nationals
traveling to the United States would not pose a security threat
upon their arrival. The president’s proclamation imposes sub-
stantial travel restrictions on foreign nationals from Iran,
Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. The
order provides various waivers and exemptions, and also pro-
vides for a reassessment of those countries’ status every 180
days. Together with U.S. citizens and lawful permanent resi-
dents who have family members in the targeted nations, the
State of Hawaii challenged the proclamation, arguing that it
exceeds the president’s powers
under the Immigration and
Nationality Act and violates the
First Amendment’s Establish-
ment Clause. Ruling in favor of
the plaintiffs, the district court
issued a nationwide injunction
barring the president from
implementing the proclamation, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.
Splitting 5-4 along familiar lines, the Court reversed.58 Writ-
ing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that, so
far as statutory authority is concerned, the president’s procla-
mation falls squarely within the power that Congress conferred
in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). That statute declares that,
[w]henever the President finds that the entry of any
aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States
would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States, he may by proclamation . . . suspend the entry of
all aliens or any class of aliens . . . or impose on the entry
of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that this statutory provision
“exudes deference to the President in every clause” and that
the proclamation “falls well within this comprehensive delega-
tion.”59
With respect to the Establishment Clause, the majority
acknowledged the President’s anti-Muslim statements and
hinted that those statements were not consistent with the
nation’s historic commitment to religious freedom.60 When it
comes to evaluating a president’s decisions about whom to
exclude from the country for national-security reasons, how-
ever, the majority said that the judiciary should apply nothing
more searching than rational-basis review. The Court then
upheld the president’s proclamation, finding that it can rea-
sonably be understood as a measure aimed at preventing the
entry of foreign nationals who cannot be adequately vetted for
security risks. The majority placed particular weight on the
proclamation’s content, the multi-agency review on which the
president purported to rely, the fact that the proclamation
leaves much of the world’s Muslim population free to travel to
the United States, and the fact that the president has targeted
countries that Congress and prior administrations have
deemed problematic.
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Justice Breyer dissented,
joined by Justice Kagan, arguing
that there is evidence indicating
that, although the proclamation
might be valid on its face, it is
not being applied as written.
They invited the district court to
explore that possibility on
remand. If pressed to rule on the
proclamation without any fur-
ther litigation, however, these
justices said that the evidence of anti-Muslim bias is sufficient to
render the proclamation unconstitutional. Joined by Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor argued the Establishment Clause
point at greater length, insisting that—based on a long list of
statements made by President Trump both before and after tak-
ing office—“a reasonable observer would conclude that the
Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus.”61 Justice
Sotomayor also appeared to worry that the Court itself was man-
ifesting anti-Muslim bias by looking closely at government
actors’ past statements to root out anti-Christian bias in Master-
piece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission62 (dis-
cussed under the “Religion” heading, below) but by refusing to
make any significant evidentiary use of President Trump’s anti-
Muslim statements. Justice Sotomayor also warned that the
majority’s ruling bore “stark parallels” to Korematsu v. United
States,63 in which the Court infamously upheld President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s order authorizing the military to place
thousands of Japanese-Americans in internment camps during
World War II.64 On behalf of the majority, Chief Justice Roberts
replied that “it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant
order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nation-
als the privilege of admission.”65
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Suppose you take your car to a dealership for servicing. A
service advisor greets you, listens while you describe the auto-
motive problems you’ve been experiencing, recommends a
particular course of action, and telephones you if the mechanic
spots any unforeseen problems while doing the work. Is your
service advisor “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automo-
biles” within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
thus exempt from that statute’s overtime-pay requirement? The
Court answered that question in the affirmative in Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro.66 Writing for the 5-4 majority, Jus-
tice Thomas reasoned that “[s]ervice advisors are integral to
the servicing process,”67 there is no good reason to continue
the practice of construing the FLSA’s exemptions narrowly, and
the legislative history’s silence on the question of service advi-
sors’ status is insignificant. Writing for the dissent, Justice
Ginsburg argued that, because service advisors do not them-
selves typically perform repairs, they fall outside the exemp-
tion and thus are entitled to overtime pay under the statute. By
refusing to construe the servicing exemption narrowly, Justice
Ginsburg charged, the majority disregarded “more than half a
century of our precedent,” “without even acknowledging that
it [was doing so].”68
RELIGION69
In one of the Term’s most widely discussed cases, the jus-
tices ruled 7-2 in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission70 that Colorado officials had violated the
First Amendment free-exercise rights of a Christian baker who
refused to produce a custom-made wedding cake for a same-
sex couple. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission deter-
mined that the baker, Jack Phillips, had violated the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act, which forbids discrimination on
grounds of sexual orientation (among other traits) in places of
public accommodation.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy observed that, as
a general matter, “religious and philosophical objections . . . do
not allow business owners and other actors in the economy
and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods
and services under a neutral and generally applicable law.”71
Were the rule otherwise, Justice Kennedy explained, “a long
list of persons who provide goods and services for marriages
and weddings might refuse to do so for gay persons, thus
resulting in a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the
history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal
access to goods, services, and public accommodations.”72
But in this particular instance, Justice Kennedy wrote, Col-
orado officials manifested “a clear and impermissible hostility
toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated [Phillips’s]
objection.”73 During public hearings on Phillips’s case, for
example, a member of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
had indicated that Phillips’s religious objections amounted to
“‘one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric.’”74 Moreover, in
at least three instances, the commission had ruled that bakers
could refuse to make cakes conveying messages of disapproval
of same-sex marriage, and the manner in which the commis-
sion handled those cases differed in noteworthy ways from the
manner in which it handled Phillips’s case. Putting all of those
evidentiary pieces together, the Court concluded that the com-
mission had violated “the First Amendment’s guarantee that
our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward reli-
gion.”75
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Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas wrote a separate
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
arguing that Phillips’s custom-made wedding cakes amounted
to protected expression and that Colorado could restrict that
expression only if its reasons for doing so were sufficient to
satisfy strict scrutiny. (The majority declined to reach Phillips’s
free-speech claim.) Joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Gins-
burg dissented, finding insufficient evidence of hostility
toward Phillips’s religion. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent prompted
Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Alito) to respond with a
concurrence aimed at underscoring the evidence of impermis-
sible hostility.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Two years ago, the Justices all agreed that Congress could
not enact a statute declaring that, in the pending hypothetical
case of Smith v. Jones, “Smith wins.”76 In 2018’s Patchak v.
Zinke,77 however, the justices sharply divided on whether that
is what Congress had done in a lawsuit involving the Match-E-
Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (“the Band”)
in southwestern Michigan. In 2009, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior took a 147-acre tract of land known as the Bradley Prop-
erty into trust for the benefit of the Band so that the Band
could build a casino there. At the same time those events were
occurring, a nearby landowner—David Patchak—was pursu-
ing federal litigation challenging the legality of the Secretary’s
actions. In 2012, the Supreme Court rejected the Secretary’s
defense of sovereign immunity and held that Patchak’s lawsuit
could proceed.78 Congress then enacted a statute ratifying the
Secretary’s actions and declaring that “an action (including an
action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment
of this Act) relating to the [Bradley Property] shall not be filed
or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dis-
missed.”79 Was that an unconstitutional declaration of “Smith
wins”?
No, concluded a plurality formed by Justices Thomas,
Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Writing for that group, Justice
Thomas explained that the key question was whether Congress
had purported to compel a result in a particular lawsuit under
old law (impermissible) or whether Congress had changed the
law and thereby influenced the outcome in a pending lawsuit
(permissible). The plurality determined that Congress had
done the latter:
[The statute] changes the law. Specifically, it strips
federal courts of jurisdiction over actions “relating to”
the Bradley Property. Before the Gun Lake Act, federal
courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Now they do not. This kind of legal
change is well within Con-
gress’s authority and does not
violate Article III.80
Joined by Justices Kennedy and
Gorsuch in dissent, Chief Justice
Roberts wasn’t buying it. Never
before, he argued, had Congress
“gone so far as to target a single
party for adverse treatment and
direct the precise disposition of his pending case.”81 The Chief
Justice wrote:
Does the plurality really believe that there is a mater-
ial difference between a law stating “The court lacks
jurisdiction over Jones’s pending suit against Smith” and
one stating “In the case of Smith v. Jones, Smith wins”? In
both instances, Congress has resolved the specific case
in Smith’s favor.82
Joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg opted to
avoid the “Smith wins” issue altogether. All that Congress had
done here, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, was reassert the federal
government’s sovereign immunity in any action concerning the
Bradley Property. Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to say
that she would join the dissent on the “Smith wins” question,
were it not for the strength of Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning on
sovereign immunity. With their two votes added to those in the
plurality, the Band emerged from the lawsuit victorious.
SPEECH
If points were given to each ruling based on the degree to
which its outcome was important, predictable, and likely to pro-
duce a 5-4 split along familiar ideological lines, the prize this
year would likely go to Janus v AFSCME,83 handed down on the
Term’s final day. In 2012 and 2014,84 the Court’s Republican
appointees signaled that they had serious constitutional doubts
about Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.85 In that landmark
1977 ruling, the Court held that the First Amendment permits a
public-sector union and the governmental employer with which
it contracts to require employees within a union-represented
bargaining unit to pay the union “agency fees,” even if those
employees have refused to become union members. “Agency
fees” are fees calculated to cover an employee’s share of the costs
the union incurs in collective bargaining and related activities.
Shortly after Justice Scalia’s death, the eight-member Court
divided 4-4 in a case that asked whether Abood should be
retained or overruled.86 With Justice Gorsuch now holding the
Court’s ninth seat, the 5-4 Janus Court explicitly overruled
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Abood, holding that agency-fee
requirements violate the First
Amendment rights of public
employees who are not union
members and do not wish to
subsidize the union’s speech.
Justice Alito wrote for the
majority. “Forcing free and
independent individuals to
endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning,” he
said, and “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize the speech of
other private speakers” is no less troubling.87 Pointing out that
the federal government and twenty-eight states ban agency fees,
Justice Alito found that imposing such fees is not necessary to
create functional workplaces and successful employer-
employee relations. Nor is the government’s interest in prevent-
ing free-riding by non-members on the backs of dues-paying
union members sufficiently compelling to justify forcing non-
members to subsidize speech they find objectionable.88 With
respect to the analytic framework launched in Pickering v. Board
of Education89 for evaluating public employees’ freedom of
speech, Justice Alito found that Pickering is a bad fit for deter-
mining the scope of the government’s power to compel large
numbers of its employees to speak. Even if the Court did apply
Pickering here, he wrote, unions would lose. The positions that
unions take in collective bargaining on wages, health insurance,
and the like concern matters of great public significance, and
there is no governmental interest sufficiently weighty to justify
requiring employees to subsidize the union’s speech on those
subjects. Turning to stare decisis, the Court said that the doc-
trine “applies with perhaps least force of all to decisions that
wrongly denied First Amendment rights.”90 In the eyes of the
majority, neither reliance interests nor any other factor weighed
heavily in favor of retaining the Abood framework.
Justice Kagan wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. She argued that, consistent
with Pickering and other cases, “the Abood regime was a para-
digmatic example of how the government can regulate speech
in its capacity as an employer.”91 “But the worse part of today’s
opinion,” she wrote, “is where the majority subverts all known
principles of stare decisis,”92 overturning Abood for no better
reason than that the justices in the majority “wanted to.”93 She
accused those justices of “weaponizing the First Amend-
ment,”94 using it to declare winners and losers in economic and
social matters that should be left to the democratic process.
The justices found somewhat greater unity in Minnesota Vot-
ers Alliance v. Mansky.95 Led by Chief Justice Roberts, the 7-2
Court struck down Minnesota’s wide-ranging ban on political
apparel in polling places on Election Day. Finding that polling
places are nonpublic forums, where speech restrictions need
merely be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable, the Court did not
entirely close the door to speech restrictions in those locations.
The Chief Justice emphasized that “we see no basis for reject-
ing Minnesota’s determination that some forms of advocacy
should be excluded from the polling place, to set it aside as an
island of calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their
choices.”96 The problem with Minnesota’s law concerned the
First Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. In the eyes of
the majority, the state had failed “to articulate some sensible
basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay
out.”97 The state had argued that the ban extended only to
messages concerning matters on which candidates or parties
had taken positions, but the Court found that “[a] rule whose
fair enforcement requires an election judge to maintain a men-
tal index of the platforms and positions of every candidate and
party on the ballot is not reasonable.”98 The state ran into fur-
ther trouble with the Court at oral argument when handling
the justices’ hypotheticals. The state’s attorneys argued, for
example, that a shirt bearing the text of the Second Amend-
ment would be barred, while a shirt bearing the text of the
First Amendment would be permitted. The Court concluded
that Minnesota’s law swept too broadly and left election offi-
cials with too much unguided discretion.99
In the Term’s other major ruling on speech—National Insti-
tute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra100—the 5-4 Court
weighed in against a California law requiring that notices of
specified types be posted in pro-life clinics providing preg-
nancy-related services. The law requires licensed clinics to
post notices alerting clients that the state provides free or low-
cost family-planning services—including abortions—and to
post a phone number that clients can call for further informa-
tion about those services. The law requires unlicensed clinics
to post a notice alerting clients that the clinics’ personnel are
not licensed to provide medical services. The Ninth Circuit
denied clinics’ request for preliminary injunctive relief against
both requirements, finding that the First Amendment gives
California significant latitude to regulate “professional speech”
and that the clinics are unlikely to succeed on the merits at
trial. The Supreme Court, however, reversed.
Writing for the five-member majority, Justice Thomas
124 Court Review - Volume 54 
“[Justice Thomas]
drew at least a
loose parallel
[with] actions 
taken by Mao
Zedong[.]”
101. Id. at 2366.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
103. 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018).
104. Section 1367(e) instructs federal courts to treat D.C. law like
state law.
105. Artis, 138 S. Ct. at 602-03.
106. Id. at 617 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
107. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
108. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
109. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
turned first to the law concerning licensed clinics. California’s
requirement is content-based, he explained, because it alters
the content of what the clinics are required to tell their clients.
He then said there is no historical basis for the Ninth Circuit’s
(and some other lower courts’) finding that content-based reg-
ulations of professional speech merit something less demand-
ing than strict scrutiny. The closest the Court has come to that
view, Justice Thomas wrote, is in rulings applying a more per-
missive form of review to “laws that require professionals to
disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘com-
mercial speech’” regarding the services they provide and in rul-
ings allowing states to “regulate professional conduct, even
though that conduct incidentally involves speech.”101 The
Court found that neither of those lines of precedent was
applicable here. In a remarkable passage, Justice Thomas drew
at least a loose parallel between California’s requirement and
actions taken by Mao Zedong, the Soviets, the Nazis, and Nico-
lae Ceausescu. Even if intermediate scrutiny were applied, the
Court concluded, the notice requirement could not meet it
because, if the state’s aim is to inform low-income women
about state-sponsored services, the requirement is vastly
under-inclusive. With respect to the notice requirement
imposed on unlicensed clinics, the Court held both that the
state has not yet identified any real, non-hypothetical need that
the requirement meets and that the law is unduly burdensome.
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan in dis-
sent, Justice Breyer argued that (among other things) the
Court’s ruling threatens to imperil a vast range of state laws
requiring speech of various kinds; that the majority under-
mined the evenhanded rule of law by striking down a statute
requiring a notice about abortion services while not satisfac-
tory distinguishing laws requiring a notice about adoption ser-
vices; and that the majority was insufficiently deferential to the
state’s conclusion that clients of unlicensed clinics should be
alerted on-site that the personnel at those clinics are not
licensed to provide medical care.
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
When a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a
given claim, the supplemental jurisdiction statute—28 U.S.C. §
1367—authorizes the court also to take jurisdiction over state
claims that form part of “the same case or controversy.”102 If a
court subsequently dismisses the claim over which it initially
had original jurisdiction, it typically will also dismiss any addi-
tional claims that it had swept in. When that occurs, the
claimant might naturally wish to file his or her trailing claims
in state court. But what if the state’s statute of limitations for
those claims expired during the federal proceedings? Congress
anticipated that problem in Section 1367(d):
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under
subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action
that is voluntarily dismissed at
the same time as or after the dis-
missal of the claim under subsec-
tion (a), shall be tolled while the
claim is pending and for a period
of 30 days after it is dismissed
unless State law provides for a
longer tolling period.
In Artis v. District of Columbia,103
Stephanie Artis sought to take advantage of that tolling provi-
sion. She had sued the District of Columbia in federal court for
employment discrimination, asserting a claim under federal law
as well as claims under D.C. law.104 At the time Artis filed her
suit, nearly two years remained in the limitations period for her
D.C. claims. Two and a half years later, the federal district court
granted the District’s motion for summary judgment on the fed-
eral claim and declined to retain jurisdiction over Artis’s remain-
ing claims. Artis filed the non-federal claims in the D.C. Supe-
rior Court 59 days later. Were those claims now time-barred?
Dividing 5-4, the Court held that the claims were timely
filed. All of the justices agreed that there were two possible
ways to read Section 1367’s tolling provision. On the “stop the
clock” reading, the clock on D.C.’s limitations period entirely
stopped during the federal proceedings, such that Artis had
roughly two years to file her D.C. claims after the federal dis-
trict court dismissed them. On the “grace period” reading, the
clock on D.C.’s limitations period continued to run, but Sec-
tion 1367(d) ensured that, if that clock had counted down to
zero by the time her D.C. claims were dismissed, Artis would
have at least 30 days to file those claims in an appropriate
court. Led by Justice Ginsburg, a majority of the Court adopted
the “stop the clock” interpretation, finding that, in all other
legislation in which Congress has used the word “tolled,” it has
meant “‘suspended,’ or ‘paused,’ or ‘stopped.’”105 Writing for
the dissent, Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s ruling
“ensures that traditional state law judgments about the appro-
priate lifespan of state law claims will be routinely displaced—
and displaced in favor of nothing more than a fortuity (the
time a claim sits in federal court) that bears no rational rela-
tionship to any federal interest.”106
TAXES
For the past half century, the Dormant Commerce Clause
rule under National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of
Illinois107—as reaffirmed in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota108—was
that a state could not require a seller to collect sales taxes on
goods and services sold to residents of that state unless the
seller had a physical presence there. In this Term’s South
Dakota v. Wayfair,109 the justices all agreed that Bellas Hess was
wrongly decided. What divided them 5-4 was whether the
Court should do anything about it.
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Led by Justice Kennedy, a majority of the Court concluded
that it should. The case concerned South Dakota’s effort to
require out-of-state sellers to collect sales taxes for goods and
services sold within the state if they annually did business
exceeding $100,000 in South Dakota or engaged in at least 200
separate transactions there. The state sought to compel three
large online retailers to collect sales taxes pursuant to the new
legislation, even though they did not maintain physical pres-
ences within the state. Citing Bellas Hess and Quill, the courts
below ruled in favor of the online retailers. Justice Kennedy
and his colleagues in the majority concluded, however, that
Bellas Hess and Quill should be overturned.
The Court reasoned that (among other things) the physical-
presence requirement makes no sense in an era in which so
many economic transactions are conducted over the Internet,
“is a poor proxy for the compliance costs faced by companies
that do business in multiple States,”110 incentivizes sellers to
avoid establishing stores or other potentially desirable pres-
ences in multiple states, and amounts to “an extraordinary
imposition by the Judiciary on States’ authority to collect taxes
and perform critical public functions.”111 Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that Congress has long had the authority to
reject the physical-presence requirement and that the Court
should be reluctant to overturn its own precedents, but he con-
cluded that “[i]t is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to
ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this
Court’s own creation.”112 The Court said that the lower courts
could determine on remand whether any other Commerce
Clause principle invalidates South Dakota’s tax law, but the
Court also indicated that South Dakota has gone a long way
toward successfully avoiding any discrimination or undue-
burden concerns. It has done so by exempting out-of-state sell-
ers that do only minimal business in the state, by declaring that
the tax law will not be applied retroactively, and by adopting
the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (legislation that,
in a variety of ways, aims to simplify the adopting state’s sales
tax system and thereby reduce the compliance burden).
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in dissent,
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Court should have left it
to Congress to respond to any problems created by Bellas Hess’s
physical-presence requirement. Chief Justice Roberts noted
that most of the nation’s largest online retailers already collect
sales taxes on behalf of the states in which they make sales.
Forcing the rest of them to do so, he argued, carries pros and
cons that Congress is best equipped to evaluate.
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund,113
the Court held that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 does not take away state courts’ power to adjudi-
cate class actions brought entirely under the Securities Act of
1933. The Court further held that SLUSA does not allow defen-
dants to remove such class actions from state to federal court.
The Court held in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh114 that, when
a district court refuses to certify a proposed class, “a putative
class member [may not], in lieu of promptly joining an exist-
ing suit or promptly filing an individual action, commence a
class action anew beyond the time allowed by the applicable
statute of limitations.”115
In Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharma-
ceutical Co.,116 the Court held that, when trying to determine a
question of foreign law, a federal district court is not rigidly
required to accept as dispositive an official statement submit-
ted by that foreign nation’s government. Rather, a district court
may consider such things as “the statement’s clarity, thorough-
ness, and support; its context and purpose; the transparency of
the foreign legal system; the role and authority of the entity or
official offering the statement; and the statement’s consistency
with the foreign government’s past positions.”117
In Ohio v. American Express Company,118 the 5-4 Court
rejected an antitrust challenge to American Express’s use of
contractual provisions barring merchants from steering their
customers away from using their American Express cards.
LOOKING AHEAD
One can find a continually updated list of cases slated for
the October 2018 Term on the “Merits Cases” page at SCO-
TUSblog.com. At the time of this writing, perhaps the most
broadly significant civil cases on the Court’s docket involve
disputes about whether small public employers are bound by
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s requirements,119
whether the Court should overrule precedent allowing one
state to be sued in another state’s courts without its consent,120
and whether property owners should continue to be required
to exhaust their state remedies before filing a Fifth Amend-
ment takings claim.121 Given the unfailing ability of human
interaction to produce legal disputes of great import to the rest
of us, that list will surely grow. 
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